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Historical study of dams conceived in earlier times is essential. To continue advancing, the engineering profession must periodically 
review past problems and the lessons that they taught. Candid sharing of information on failures as well as successes is needed. In 
fact, some of the most valuable learning has come from projects where errors have been clear in retrospect.  In recent years, dam 
safety has drawn increasing attention from the public. This is because floods resulting from breaching of dams can lead to devastating 
disasters with tremendous loss of life and property, especially in densely populated areas. Past dam failure disasters showed that the 
loss of life in the event of a dam failure is directly related to the warning time available to evacuate the population at risk downstream 
of the dam. Earth and rock fill dams are widely used throughout the world, and most of the dam failures involve such dams. To speak 
about failures of dams without a brief account of these happenings in the dam world is not possible.  Therefore, it is essential to go 
through the case histories of such dam failures to understand the causes of failures of the dams failed in the past. The main causes of 
failures of such dams are attributed to overtopping, internal erosion and piping. There are excellent sources and case studies are 
available in the literature related to failure of the earthen dams due to overtopping, internal erosion and piping. The purpose of this 
paper is to highlight the most promising causes of the earthen dam failures and present the case histories of the dams failed in the 
world due to these causes. The case histories reported in this paper are chosen not for the entity of the damage occurred, but are 




Case histories in geotechnical engineering serve a number of 
useful purposes, one of which is to provide real data against 
which designers can test their predictions of behavior. There is 
ample evidence to indicate that, despite the many advances 
made in geotechnical engineering and engineering science in 
the past the designer’s ability to predict the behavior of 
designed structures accurately has not increased. The reasons 
for this apparent lack of improvement are numerous, and 
perhaps it will always be as difficult to make accurate 
geotechnical predictions as it is to make predictions of human 
behavior. 
 
In considering predictions related to geotechnical engineering, 
Lambe (1973) classified the predictions as shown in Table 1. 
 
Our professional literature contains the results of more type C1 
predictions than of any other type. Autopsies can of course be 
very helpful in contributing to our knowledge. However, one 
must be suspicious when an author uses type C1 predictions to 
‘prove’ that any prediction technique is correct. 
 
 
Table 1 Classification of prediction 
 
Prediction type When prediction 
made 





















In an attempt to present the type C1 predictions, this paper 
considers a number of case histories related to embankment 
dam failures. Failure of a dam can result in a major disaster 
with devastating losses of both human life and property. The 
phenomenon is time-dependent, multiphase (water-soil 
interaction), and non-homogeneous (different materials, 
various degrees of soil compaction, and so on). Hydraulics, 
hydrology, sediment transport mechanism, and structural and 
geotechnical aspects are all involved in dam failures. Erosion 
of an earth-dam can be primed by low or weak points on the 
crest or on the downstream face, by piping or overtopping. 
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Progressive erosion then widens and deepens the breach, 
increasing outflow and erosion rate. 
 
Internal erosion and piping has historically resulted in about 
0.5% (1 in 200) earthen dams failing, and 1.5% (1 in 60) 
experiencing a piping incident. Of these failures and accidents, 
about half are in the embankment, 40% in the foundations, and 
10% from the embankment to foundation (Foster et al. 1998, 
2000a, b). Fewer incidents of piping in the foundation, and 
particularly from embankment to foundation, progress to 
failure, than for piping in the embankment. About two thirds 
the failures occur on first filling or in the first five years of the 
operation.  
 
A number of studies have been devoted to investigating dam 
failures. Research on failure case histories and the resulting 
evolution of safety philosophy and practice is, and continues 
to be, a very dynamic process. Any advance in it provides 
answers to some pending questions, while others remain open 
and new ones are coming up. It cannot be possible to speak 
about failures of dams without a brief account of these 
happenings in the dam world. 
 
In this paper an attempt has been made to discuss the main 
causes of failure of earthen dams - overtopping, internal 
erosion and piping and present the case histories of the earthen 
dams failed in the world due to these causes. The case 
histories reported in this paper are chosen not for the entity of 




2. MAIN CAUSES OF EMBANKMENT DAMS   
    FAILURE 
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that the main causes 
of failures of embankment dams are closely related to the 
erosion of embankment materials caused by either overtopping 
or seepage erosion/piping. Ralston (1987) discussed the 
mechanism of embankment erosion from overtopping. For 
non-cohesive embankments, materials are removed from the 
embankment in layers by tractive stresses. The erosion process 
from overtopping begins at a point where the tractive shear 
stress exceeds a critical resistance that keeps the material in 
place. For cohesive embankments, breaching takes place by 
head cutting. Usually, a head cut initiates near the down-
stream toe of the dam, and then advances upstream until the 
crest of the dam is breached. The basic erosion mechanisms 
and erosion rate as pointed out by Singh (1996) are different 
for granular and cohesive embankments. For granular 
embankments, surface slips take place quickly due to the 
seepage existing on the downstream slope; and hence granular 
materials are removed rapidly layer by layer. For cohesive 
embankments, no seepage exists on the slope because of the 
low permeability. Instead, erosion often begins at the 
embankment toe and advances upstream, undercutting the 
slope and in turn causing the removal of large chunks of 
materials due to tensile or shear failure of the soil on the over-
steepened slope. 
Other than overtopping, internal erosion and piping are 
another common mode of failures of embankment dams. 
Piping phenomenon as defined by ASTM (2002) is the 
progressive removal of soil particles from a mass by a 
percolating water, leading to the development of channels. 
According to McCook (2004), seepage erosion occurs when 
the water flowing through cracks or defect erodes the soil 
from the walls of the crack or defect. Internal erosion and 
piping can be divided into four phases: initiation and 
continuation of erosion, progression to form a pipe and 
formation of a breach (Fell et al., 2003). In general, the 
seepage erosion/piping failure initiates when the 
erosion/piping resistant forces are smaller than the 
erosion/piping driving forces, resulting in the removal of soil 
particles through large voids or existing discontinuities in soil. 
After a large amount of embankment materials has been 
washed away by seeping flow, a free path named “pipe” is 
formed through the dam. Then, the erosion advances quite 
rapidly until the portion of the materials above the pipe 
becomes unstable and collapses. After the collapse, the 
subsequent erosion proceeds in the same fashion as in the case 
of overtopping (Xu and Zhang, 2009).  
 
 
3. FAILURE CAUSED BY OVERTOPPING 
 
Overtopping is by far one of the most frequent causes of dam 
failures, in particular for embankment dams. When 
overtopping hits embankment dams, the effects can turn into 
disasters.     According to the international committee on large 
dams (ICOLD, 1995), and the work of Foster et al. (2000), one 
–third or more of the total identified failures was caused by 
dam overtopping. Overtopping of a dam is generally the 
consequence of an extreme flood event and is often a 
precursor of partial or complete dam failure. The analysis of 
case histories of this cause of dam failure reveals the 
inadequacy of formerly used hydrological methods to estimate 
extreme floods and the specifications for the selection of the 
spillway design conditions. Recently the advances on 
hydrology and on climatic processes have allowed obtaining 
better estimations of extreme flood events with a reduction of 
overtopping occurrence. Hence, hydrological reliable data are 
essential for dam safety and criteria of minimum risk have to 
be assumed in the evaluation of the design flood. 
 
In this section, three case histories of earthen dam failures due 
to overtopping are briefly presented. Failures of these dams 
are related to the undersize of outlets and spillways, flood 
gates operation and human errors. 
 
 
3.1 Belci Dam Failure 
 
The Belci dam, a clay core earth-fill structure provided by an 
upstream concrete facing, was built in 1962 on Tazlaur River, 
near Slobozia in Romania (Diacon et al., 1992; Vogel, 1993). 
This dam was 18.5 m high, 432 m long earthen structure with 
a storage capacity of 12.7 Mm
3
. The hydrological 
measurements for the estimation and pre-calculation of design 
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floods for this dam had only been collected from a gauging 
station 10 km upstream from the dam site for ten years prior to 
construction. During its 29 years of operation, floods occurred 
on Tazlaur River with peak values much more than those 
estimated at Belci dam. On 7 July 1970 a peak inflow of 980 
m3/sec caused overtopping of the dam and part of the left 
wing was eroded. After further floods on 29 May 1971 and in 





respectively, a new calculation for the design floods was 
commissioned. However the spillway capacity was never 
changed because at the same time the risk classification of the 
dam was reduced. 
 
On 28 July 1991 heavy rainfall occurred, which caused the 
failure of main telephone lines and power supply. Due to 
failure of the main telephone lines no prediction of flood 
warnings could be sent from the upstream catchment areas to 
the dam site. The bottom outlet could not be opened more than 
40cm due to power failure at the site. Emergency power was 
also unavailable and the gates could not be opened manually 
as timber and debris were blocking the bottom outlet. At 02.15 
am on 29 July the dam began to overtop and the reservoir was 
emptied by 07.15 am. Twenty five people were killed by the 
flood wave caused by the dam break and 119 houses were 
destroyed. 
 
The peak inflow of 1200 m
3
/sec measured by a water gauge 
located at downstream was lower than the later estimated 1-in-
100-year flood of 1515 m
3
/sec. The initial dam break occurred 
at the same point where the dam had been affected by erosion 
in 1970. The final size of the breach was about 112 m long 
and 15 m deep (fig.1). Post-failure measurements of the intact 
dam crest near this initial break showed that the repair works 
had produced the effect of a natural overflow section. A cable 
trench that had been dug along the dam crest also had a 
negative and accelerating influence with regards to the process 




Fig. 1.  The Belci dam after failure. 
 
3.2 Tous Dam Collapse 
 
Tous dam was a 70 m high rockfill dam with a central clay 
core located near Valencia, Spain, failed due to overtopping. It  
was designed and built as a flood defense structure being also 
used for regulation and irrigation. Its construction was started 
in 1958 following a project of a concrete dam 80 m tall. 
During foundation works geotechnical conditions revealed a 
problem and construction was stopped in 1964. It was 
continued in 1974 with a modified project, in which the 
central part had been changed to loose material design with 
clay core and finally finished in 1978. It was earth-gravity 
dam 70 m tall with 400 m crest length. The dam was provided 
with radial gates to regulate the spillway whose capacity was 
7000 m
3
/s; the bottom outlet had a capacity of 250m
3
/s. 
During October 19 and specially 20, 1982, heavy rain took 
place in the Jùcar basin close to Tous dam. Heaviest rain was 
recorded in the Cofrentes area, about 25 km north-west of 
Tous dam. Total rainfall in Cofrentes exceeded 550 mm with 
285 mm falling in only 3 hours. The estimated inflow was 
5000 m
3
/s and the gates of the spillway were to be opened. 
Unfortunately, the electric network was out of order due to the 
weather conditions; moreover, of the two emergency diesel 
generators, one was under repair and the other could not be 
started. Efforts to raise the gates manually were fruitless. 
 
The overtopping started at 17.00 pm; the water overcame the 
dam reaching about 1.10 m above the crest at 19.15 pm. About 
16 h after recognizing the impossibility of overtopping the 
flood gates, the dam was overtopped and washed out after 1 h 
by erosion of a greater part of the shoulders and of the central 
rock-fill. After such an extraordinary flood, in the downstream 
basin 8 people lost their lives and about 100,000 people had to 
be evacuated. The damages were estimated to reach 400 M$, 
even if part of these damages were likely to be caused by the 
floods before the arrival of the break wave (fig. 2). 
 
A new Tous dam was built on the same site and part of the 
clayey core material, which had shown a relatively high 






Fig. 2.  The Tous dam after failure. 
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3.3 Taum Sauk Dam Failure 
 
The Taum Sauk dam (upper reservoir) suffered failure on 14 
December, 2005, located in Missouri State (USA), is part of a 
pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant which was 
constructed from 1960-1962 and began operation in 1963. The 
lower reservoir was formed by constructing a 60 feet high 
concrete gravity dam along the East Fork of the Black River 3 
miles upstream of Lesterville, MO. The upper reservoir was 
sited on Proffit Mountain, approximately 800 feet above the 
lower reservoir and connected by a 7,000 feet long tunnel. The 
majority of the upper reservoir’s rockfill embankment appears 
to have been constructed through simple end dumping of the 
excavated material. High rates of settlement were experienced 
at the upper reservoir during the first four and a half years of 
operation and it continued up to the time of failure in 
December 2005, with differential settlements approaching two 
feet along the crest of the reservoir’s parapet wall. Since its 
construction, the reservoir suffered minor leaks that were 
reduced when in 2004 a geo-synthetic liner was installed on 
the upstream facing of the dam. 
 
 A variety of design/construction flaws, instrumentation error, 
and human errors contributed to a catastrophic failure of the 
upper reservoir on Dec 14, 2005. Malfunctioning and 
improperly programmed/placed sensors failed to indicate that 
the reservoir was full and didn’t shut down the facility’s 
pumps until water had been overflowing for 5-6 minutes. This 
overflow undermined the parapet wall and scoured the 
underlying embankment, leading to a complete failure within 
5-6 minutes due to overtopping. Figure 3 shows the breach 
through embankment of the dam. The peak flow from this 




Fig. 3.  Breach through Taum Sauk embankment 
 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission found guilty 
owner’s of the dam for his decision to continue operating the 
dam despite knowing the malfunctioning of the sensors and 
fined $15 million; the largest fine ever accessed by the agency.   
 
4. FAILURE CAUSED BY INTERNAL EROSION IN  
    THE DAM BODY AND FOUNDATION 
 
Internal erosion and piping through a dam body or its 
foundation is one of the most important factors which define 
the safety structural condition and can represent a serious 
source of troubles. Piping can occur in the embankment, 
through the foundation and from the embankment into the 
foundation as a progression of internal erosion caused by 
seepage. In the case of piping failure, the incidence of piping 
through the embankment is two times higher than piping 
through the foundation and twenty times higher than piping 
from the embankment into the foundation (Foster et al., 2000). 
Further, it was noticed that half of all piping failures through 
the embankment are associated with the presence of conduits. 
The different modes of piping associated with conduits are 
piping into the conduit, along and above the conduit or out of 
the conduit (Fell et al., 2005). Other than conduit the internal 
erosion in the dam body can be caused by settlement cracks or 
even passages created by animals. Any leakage does not have 
to be underestimated and has to be carefully detected since 
quick erosion may increase initial minor defects and can 
become potentially dangerous. In this section the case history 
of Teton dam and Baldwin Hills dam failures due to erosion in 




4.1 Teton Dam Failure 
 
Teton Dam, a 93 m (305 ft.) high with a crest length of 975 m 
(3200 ft) earth fill dam across the Teton River in Madison 
County, southeast Idaho, failed completely during first filling 
at 11:57 AM on June 5, 1976. The water surface was 9 m 
below the crest of the dam.  Failure was initiated at 7.30 AM 
by a large leak near the right (northwest) abutment of the dam, 
about 39 m (130 ft) below the crest. The structure was 
breached 4.30 h later as a result of internal erosion (Fig. 4),  
causing the loss of 11 lives and extensive flooding in the 
farmland and towns below the dam. Peak flow at the time of 




The dam, designed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, failed 
just as it was being completed and filled for the first time. This 
failure of a modern dam so soon after construction was a 
shock to the engineering community. It prompted one of the 
most intensive investigations of any dam failure. A panel of 
experts investigated that the failure of dam was related to 
erosion and piping phenomena which occurred in the key 
trench fill on the right abutment possibly caused by seepage 
through cracks. 
 
The expert’s panel supposed that the seepage occurred due to 
either deficiencies of grouting in the sealing of rock joints or 
differential settlements in the key trench fill itself, or a 
combination of both causes. Further investigations carried out 
on the remains of the left embankment detected the presence 
of ‘wet seams’ (horizontal lenses varied in thickness from 75 
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to 200 mm) in some of the construction layers. Such wet 
seams possibly caused by the unsuccessful attempts to mix dry 
and wet soils during the construction of core layers, thus 
creating low-density zones undetected during the earth work 
controls. The seepage through the key trench fill could have 
been the seat of intense flow leading to erosion and piping of 
the core. 
 
Among the deficiencies of the design, one particularly relevant 
aspect was the lack of an appropriate defensive technical 
solution able to cope with the possible different modes of 
failure. Moreover, the needs of an effective control during the 





Fig. 4.  The Teton dam after failure. 
 
Investigations by commissions and boards together with 
recriminations, typical of most disasters, followed the failure 
of Teton Dam. Lessons were learned, but no attempt has been 
made to rebuild the dam. Its remnant sits today in silent 
testimony that "Nature bats last." 
 
 
4.2 Baldwin Hills Dam Failure 
 
The Baldwin Hills reservoir was a basin having four sides, 
carved and constructed on the top of the highest hill in the 
north-west-south-west chain of ridges in Los Angeles 
Country, known as the Newport-Inglewood (ICOLD, 1974). 
The reservoir, approximately rhomboid in shape, consisted of 
compacted earth dykes on three sides, whereas the fourth and 
north side was closed by the main dam, 71 m high with a crest 
length of 198 m, designed as a homogeneous earth fill. The 
construction of the reservoir started in January 1947 and was 
placed in service in 1951 with a purpose of providing water to 
the northwest part of the city of Los Angeles. The reservoir 
had a storage capacity of 1.1 Mm
3
 and was served by inlet and 
outlet conduits in tunnels through east side. An impervious 
compacted clay blanket was used to cover all excavated slopes 
and constructed embankments. The blanket was 10 feet thick 
on the reservoir floor, tapering up the slopes to a lesser 
thickness. Under the blanket there was a four inch thick 
porous concrete drainage layer which was placed over an 
asphalt seal coating.  
After 12 years of operation, on December 14, 1963, at about 
11:15 A.M., an unprecedented flow of water was heard in the 
spillway pipe at Baldwin Hills Dam. The water came from 
drains under the reservoir lining. At approximately 1:00 P. M., 
muddy leakage was discovered downstream from the east 
abutment of the dam, which formed the north side of the 
reservoir. At 2:20 P. M. lowering of the reservoir water level 
revealed a 3-ft-wide break in the reservoir's inner lining. A 
futile attempt was made to plug the hole with sandbags. Water 
broke violently through the downstream face of the dam. By 
5:00 P.M., the reservoir had emptied, revealing a crack in the 
lining extending across the reservoir bottom in line with the 
breach in the dam (Fig. 5). 
 
Mr. R. B. Jansen, Chairman Engineering Board of Inquiry 
Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure, immediately after failure of 
the dam constituted a panel of experts to investigate the cause 
of failure of the dam. Expert’s panel in his investigation report 
stated that a gradual deterioration of the foundation took place 
during the life of structure and culminated with sudden failure 
on December 14, 1963. The porous concrete drain was 
damaged by early small movements at the fault, and leakage 
water found its way into the fault. These earth movements 
were mainly caused by land subsidence, locally concentrated 
along the fault which was a weak plane. During the life of the 
reservoir, erosion took place in the fault under the undamaged 
blanket and partially damaged drain. The narrow width of the 
fault permitted the porous concrete drain to span openings that 
were developing under the drain. These occurrences were 
gradual and progressive. The perviousness of the fault 
permitted the water to disappear into the hill without emerging 
on the downstream abutment. Movement occurred at the fault 
on December 14, rupturing the impervious blanket and 
admitting full reservoir pressure to the fault and to the 
drainage system for the first time. The full reservoir pressure 
in the fault forced an outlet to the surface at a point low down 
on the east abutment of the main dam. Flow developed in the 
pervious and erodible fault zone and foundation rock. The 
flow and erosion increased rapidly, a cavernous opening piped 
through the abutment, the overlying foundation and 
embankment collapsed into this opening and the reservoir 
drained quickly and completely. 
 
In summary, the reservoir and its immediate environs were 
subjected to many adverse forces, including horizontal and 
vertical displacement due to subsidence; local breaking of the 
weak foundation; some erosion at the faults and rebound 
effects due to oil field re-pressurization, reservoir loading and 
unloading in 1951 and 1957, and the final inrush of water into 
the Fault I-II zone at time of failure. 
 
From the time it was placed into service in 1951, Baldwin 
Hills Reservoir had been regarded as a model of engineering 
excellence and a source of pride to its builder and owner, the 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. In spite of 
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careful design, construction and constant surveillance, the 
reservoir failed, and lessons are to be learned from the failure. 
Facing the same site conditions now, and equipped with the 
knowledge of what went wrong at Baldwin Hills, designers 
could make several improvements. The obvious first step 
would be to avoid rigid drains so close to the water face and to 
the unstable and erodible foundation. Drains should be amply 
sized and provided with access, where possible, to facilitate 
maintenance, and earth linings should have appreciable 
plasticity. Erodible embankment and foundation elements 




Fig. 5.  Breached Baldwin Hills dam Embankment. 
 
rocks must be thoroughly explored to disclose any pre-existing 
cavities or other defects. Finally, the use of heavy construction 
equipment must be carefully controlled to avoid the damage of 





The case histories reported in this paper refer to failures that 
happened due to overtopping and internal erosion and piping 
and they have been chosen not for the entity of the damage 
occurred, but are representative of the body of knowledge that 
has been accumulated in the interest of the future safety of 
dams. These case histories are a useful lesson for owners, 
designers and builders. 
 
In the last fifty years a tremendous progress has been made in 
the development of dam design, construction and operation. 
Due to greatly improved technology as well as to the lessons 
learned by the careful analysis of incidents and failures, the 
number of dam failures has been considerably reduced. Most 
of these lessons have given rise to the improvement of safety 
criteria and have been taken into account within national 
legislations devoted to dam safety and international 
recommendations that represent a reference to the whole dam 
engineering community.  
 
Throughout the world, legislation and safety criteria for dams 
vary quit significantly. For public safety along the valley 
downstream of dams as well as for the protection of 
economical and environmental resources, the majority of the 
contemporary safety legislation and technical guidelines 
promote and support dam-break flood risk management is 
practical and important issue.    
 
Despite the increasing safety of dams due to improved 
engineering knowledge and better construction quality, a full 
non-risk guarantee is not possible and an accident can occur, 
triggered by natural hazards, human actions or just because the 
dam is losing strength capacity due to its age. 
 
 To mitigate the dam-break risk enforcement of safety control 
measures at dam site, implementation of emergency planning 
and preparedness measures in the downstream valley, early 
warning system, rescue and relief measures are essential. 
Emergency planning and effective warning systems are now 
mandatory issues in modern dam safety regulations. However, 
these measures need to be implemented with support of local 
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